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In 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Étienne Tempier, published a 
list of doctrines which had been condemned as heresy, one such 
doctrine being that of the eterna1 nature of the world. This con- 
troversy is but a minor reflection of a much wider problem: the 
encounter between the truth based on reasoning and the truth 
based on faith.1 
1 should like in these lines to discuss a matter crucial lo the 
understanding of Neoplatonic philosophy: the crossing of cultures 
-classical and Christian- in response to a problem common to 
both: the creation of the material world. This is a philosophical 
problem, but also a theological one. It is a metaphysical problem, 
but also -and perhaps for that very reason- an ethical one. This 
problem should, seemingly, be characterised by a conflict between 
such concepts as "causality" and "chance", "freedom" and "neces- 
* The present text was delivered to the University of Leeds on the occasion of 
the International Medieval Congress, 8-11 july 1996. It was originally titled "Creation 
and Freedom in Ancient Neoplatonism. A Road to the Middle Ages". 
CARROL, W.E. "S. Tommaso, Aristotele e la Creazione". Annales Theologici, 
vol. 8, fasc. 2,' 1994, p. 365. 
sityl', "God" and "the One", as well as between thinkers such as 
Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus and St. Augustine, Hegel and St. 
Thomas Aquinas. Al1 of them concepts and thinkers to be found 
at the root of Medieval philosophy and which laid the ground- 
work for many of the problems dealt with in this era of the history 
of philosophy: creationism and emanationism, the dispute over 
universals, the apparent antagonism between faith and reason, the 
boundaries between philosophy and theology, proofs of the exis- 
tence of God, the primacy of free will and freedom, relations bet- 
ween Church and State, etc. 
At least up to the point of the Cartesian separation between 
res cogitans and res extensa, it is evident to anyone who takes the 
time to think, to philosophise, that there exists a material world 
which is somehow related to something of a spiritual or intelligible 
nature which, depending on the specific circumstances, is in more 
or less intimate rontact with material existence. 
In his Timaeus, Plato had already accepted without reserve 
this sort of ontological duality: "What is that which is Becoming 
always and never is Existent? Now the one of these is apprehensi- 
ble by thought with the aid of reasoning, since it is ever uniformly 
244 consistent."2 "The other," he says, "is an object of opinion with 
the aid of unreasoning sensation, since it becomes and perishes 
and is never really existent". He sees quite clearly that there is a 
superior and an inferior, one eterna1 and the other mortal, one 
which exists of itself and is identical to itself and the other which 
exists through another, different from itself. 
But he also introduces a relationship between the two: 
"everything which is born is necessarily born through the action 
of a cause, since, whatever it may be, it cannot possibly be born 
without a cause." This relationship is causal: the superior moves 
the inferior and the inferior is moved by the superior. We can con- 
clude that creation, in Plato's view, requires the existence of a 
cause, a creator in relation to the created. He makes a key distinc- 
tion between what is and what must be. Because he asks "whether 
it has existed always, having no beginning of generation, or whet- 
her it has come into existence, having begun from some begin- 
ning." And he himself answers: "It has come into existence; for it 
is visible and tangible and possessed of a body" He then goes on 
Timaeus, 27d. Plato in twelve volumes. English Transletion by the Rev. R. G. 
Bury, Litt. D. Cambridge-Massachusets-London: Harvard University Press-William 
Heinemann Ltd., 1975. 
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to generalise: "...and al1 such things are sensible, and things sensi- 
ble, being apprehensible by opinion with the aid of sensation, 
come into existence, as we saw, and are generatedU.3 
Here we have then, the terms of the problem: on the one 
hand, the sensible, with its characteristic properties: it is visible, 
tangible, it is grasped by means of opinion and sensation, it is sub- 
ject to becoming, and birth, its birth is caused by another, it is cor- 
poreal and it never truly exists. And on the other hand, the inte- 
lligible: it is grasped through intelligence and reason, it is identi- 
cal to itself, it has always existed, it has no beginning and it is the 
cause of the birth of the sensible. 
The subject of these lines is the relationship established by 
ancient Neoplatonism between these two terms, the creator and 
the created. And in referring to ancient Neoplatonism, we have 
chosen two of its chief proponents: one of them classical 
-Plotinus- and the other decidedly Christian, although nonethe- 
less Platonic S t .  Augustine-. The question is a double one: firstly, 
does the creator create necessarily or deliberately?4 And secondly, 
does he create out of nothing or out of something? 
The first question must be answered in the light of Plotinus' 
- 
concept of the One's freedom: here, deliberation consists essen- 245 
tially of a being's belonging to itself, a belonging which is the basis 
for souveraineté, which we will translate here -somewhat freely- as 
"dominion".s This dominion is to be understood as dominion 
over the created, or at least, for the moment, over the "realised". 
The French author writes that "L'absolue souveraineté est égale 2 une 
absolue liberté1'6, in commenting on these words of Plotinus: "But 
the Principle, since it has nothing before it, has not anything else 
to be in; but since it has nothing else to be in, (...) it encompasses 
al1 the other things. But in encompassing them it is not dispersed 
Ibid., 28e. 
Obviating, from the start, any possibility of creation by chance: "To attribute 
the being and structure of this Al1 to accident and chance is unreasonable and 
belongs to a man without intelligence or perception; this is obvious even before 
demonstration and many adequate demonstrations have been set down which show 
it." (Enneads., 1112, 1-5). Plotini~s. English Translation by A.H. Armstrong. Cambridge- 
Massachusets: Harvard University Press, 1989. (hereinafter, En.) 
Cf. LEROUX, G. Plotin. Traité sur la liberté et la volonté de ?Un. Paris: Vrin, 1990, 
p. 392. The author is commenting here upon texts corresponding to: En, V5, 9, 14; 
1113, 4, 6-7 and V18, 4, 26. 
6 Ibid., p. 395. 
1 
into them and it possesses them without being possessed."7. It 
would seem that, in this manner, without mixing with things, it 
can remain free of them. This is, precisely, an initial point of con- 
tention between the Plotinist concept of the One and the 
Christian concept of a personal God: "C'est la premiere opposition 
entre ttre et volonté (... ) Dans cette opposition (... ) le chrétien argu- 
mente en faveur d'une théologie qui maintient la liberté de créer contre 
la nécessité de se diffuser ou d1émaner."8 We find, in Plotinus, a clear 
opposition between being and the need to be, which in is direct 
contradiction of the freedom of the One in the act of creation. In 
Christian terms, one cannot imagine, either philosophically or 
theologically, a God who is conditioned by his own being. But, on 
the other hand, the Simplicity of Plotinus' One leaves no room for 
any distinction in God between Being and Good, a distinction 
which seems to be closed to Christian thought. Since creation is a 
result of divine freedom, this can be nothing other than the effect 
of his will itself and not its necessary result, as Greck philosophy 
explains when speaking of heat as a necessary, rather than contin- 
gent, effect of fire.9 
What we have called the Dominion of the One over the cre- 
ated has a relatively accesible explanation: "and the giver of its 
shape will give it a shape which is different from matter itself, and 
a size, and everything, bringing them to matter, so to speak, from 
its store of realities". In effect, the One appears, at first glance, to 
dominate from outside. But its freedom is not made quite clear: 
"the idea that the will of the maker keeps in step with the size is a 
fiction. But if, too, the making principle is prior to the matter, 
matter will be exactly as the making principle wills it to be in every 
way, tractable to everything, and so to size too". The maker is in 
fact powerful but, in Plotinus, does not manage to maintain a 
complete transcendence over the material: "So when the form 
comes to the matter it brings everything with it; the form has 
everything, the size and al1 that goes with and is caused by the for- 
mative principle".lO 
This is a fundamental difference between Plotinus' One and 
the Christian God: in defending emanation, the One eliminates 
transcendence and, along with it, providence; with God, on the 
En., V, 5, 9. 
* LEROUX, p. 118. 
Cf. Ibid., p. 119. 
lo En., 114, 8, 15-25. 
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other hand, transcendence is compatible with providence. This is 
the difference between Plotinus' emanationism and St. Augustine's 
creationism. 
Where is the key to this relative imperfection of Plotinus' 
One to be found? Quite simply, in the confusion between the 
exemplary Cause and the efficient Cause. In Plotinus' view, the 
sensible world, far from being a self-constituting Hypostasis, is not 
even an Hypostasis as such, since, being nothing more than an 
image of the Intelligible, it requires a separate medium in which to 
subsist. Up to this point, Plotinus' follows in the footsteps of his 
teacher, Plato.11 But while, in Timaeus, the efficient cause, i.e. the 
Demiurge, is distinct from the exemplary cause, i.e. the living inte- 
lligible, in the Enneads, one sole hypostasis is at once the efficient 
cause and the exemplary cause, Demiurge and Model. Strictly spe- 
aking, Plotinus' Demiurge is Intelligence. But his Demiurge is very 
different from the artisans of our world, not only because it is at 
once Demiurge and Model, but also because it creates spontane- 
ously, with no deliberation whatsoeverl2, with no effort and 
merely as a consequence of being what it is.13 
Plotinus identifies not only the two causes, the efficient and 
the exemplary, but also the two causalitiesl4: for Intelligence, to 247 
exist as Model and to create an image of itself are one and the 
same. For this reason, the sensible world is an image in the stric- 
test sense.15 
This incompatibility of Plotinist emanationism and 
Christian providentialism leads back to the a corresponding 
impossibility of reconciling the doctrine of creation with Greek 
metaphysical monism:l6 "But since we affirm that this universe is 
everlasting and has never not existed, we should be correct and 
l1 In spite of what follows here, it must be stressed that both Plato and Plotinus 
recognise the need for creation by the Demiurge or the One. For example, Plato says: 
"For, in truth, this Cosmos in its origins was generated as a compound, from the 
combination of Necessity and Reason. And inasmuch as Reason was controlling 
Necessity by persuading her to conduct to the best end the most part of the things 
coming into existence, thus and thereby it came about, through necessity yielding 
to intelligent persuasion, that this Universe of ours was being in this wise construc- 
ted at the beginning." Tirnaeus, 47c. 
l2 Cf. En., V8, 7; V17, 1. 
Cf. En. 1112, 1, 43-45. 
l4 IGAL, 1. "General Introduction" to Plotino, Enbdas 1-11. Biblioteca Clásica 
Gredos, 57. Madrid: Gredos, 1992, sec. 57, pp. 72-73. 
IS Cf. En., V14, 10, 1-15. 
I6 Cf. LEROUX, p. 119. 
consistent in saying that providence for the Al1 is its being accor- 
ding to Intellect and that Intellect is before it, not in the sense that 
it is prior in time but because the universe comes from Intellect 
and Intellect is prior in nature, and the cause of the universe as a 
kind of architype and model, the universe being an image of it and 
existing by means of it and everlastingly coming into existence, in 
this wayU.l7 The identification of providence with the harmony 
between the cosmos and Intelligence is in itself tantamount to 
doing away with the One's providencial freedom: on the basis of 
the concept of providence (always in lower case in Plotinus), it is 
shown that Plotinist emanationism negates the One's creative fre- 
edom. 
Plato, in his doctrine on the origin of the world, may be clo- 
ser to Christianity than to Plotinist Neoplatonism. This is rather 
evident with regard to the pantheism inherent in Plotinus in the 
figure of the Demiurge that mediates between eterna1 material and 
the Idea, creating, although not ex nihilo, as in St. Augustine, the 
sensible world.18 
It is precisely Plato who raises the second subject we cited at 
the outset. We have seen a fundamental difference with regard to 
248 the act of producing visible things: in Plotinus, the One is extre- 
mely simple but maintains neither creative freedom nor provi- 
dence: it remains "too much" a part of things, it is "excessively" 
implicated in its own work. The first Hypostasis conserves what it 
has: it loses constantly but without diminishing: it emanates, and 
thus "makes". On the other hand, in Christian philosophy it is 
possible, through a distinction in reasoning, to explain a reality, 
not logical, but rather ontological, in God: he remains completely 
separate from the things which he creates, he maintains at once 
his freedom to create them and his divine providence; he main- 
tains them, as we shall see shortly, in being, without loss or decre- 
ase and with no risk of any sort of pantheism. Creation consists of 
making them participate in Being, while maintaining indepen- 
dence with regard to the Need to Be. 
Once again, it is Plato who frames the second question, as already 
mentioned. This is another point at which Neoplatonism is cros- 
sed with Christian philosophy: was the sensible world created out 
of nothing, -ex nihilo- or was it a result of an action carried out 
l7 En., 1112, 1, 20-28. 
l8 Cf. SALMONA, B. La liberth in Plotino, Milan: Marzorati, 1967, p. 111. 
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on something pre-existing or eternal? "For we say that it 6iso or 
6waso or 6will be,o whereas, in truth of speech, 6iso alone is the 
appropriate term; 6waso and 6will be,o on the other hand, are 
terms properly applicable to the Becoming which proceeds in 
Time, since both of these are motions."lg In Plato, there is an eter- 
nal Substance (here, in the upper case), and substances bound up 
with time and therefore with change and movement. Particular 
substances do not, therefore, exist in themselves, they are subject 
to change and Substance is the only one which exists without 
beginning or end. 
As 1 see it, Plato's approach allows us to make a certain ana- 
logy: it is, on the one hand, partly the same as and partly different 
from the classical viewpoint and, on the other hand, partly the 
same as and partly different from the Christian viewpoint. lt has 
in common with the classical viewpoint the Plotinist concept of 
the One, understood as an h'ypostasis, as a unique substance from 
which the other hypostases -including Material- emanate, accor- 
ding to the principle of loss without decrease. In common with 
the Christian viewpoint, it has the idea that the movement of par- 
ticular substances is a sort of imperfection, an accidental manner 
of being -from the Aristotelian point of view, as adopted by St. 249 
Thomas Aquinas' scholasticism- and therefore imperfect: in a 
manner of speaking, the only thing which Exists is the First Cause 
without cause, i.e. God. 
Plotinus relies on the concept of the eternal Hypostasis, 
from which everything else emanates, thereby eliminating the 
concept of creafion ex nihilo. Christian philosophy, on the basis of 
being through participation (at the most basic level, through the 
concept of substance), allows God, freely, to create beings out of 
nothing, providing one more argument in favour of Revelation.20 
As St. Thomas Aquinas points out, creation out of nothing must be 
understood in two complementary senses, one philosophical and 
the other theological. In the philosophical sense, creation out of 
nothing means that God, independently of material causes, 
ordains that al1 things exist as radically different from Himself, alt- 
hough completely dependent upon his Causality. This, doubtless, 
allows any shadow of Plotinist pantheism to be avoided. The the- 
l9 Timaeus, 38a. 
20 In 1215, the 4th Lateran Council declared that God created everything that 
is, both material and spiritual, the world and the angels, out of nothing (de nihil con- 
didit) and that this act of creation occurred nb initio temporis. 
1 
l 
ological sense of creation, based on faith, denies nothing, of the 
philosophical sense. It merely adds the fact that the created uni- 
verse has a beginning in time. This theological sense is not a phi- 
losophical fact, since it is only known through revelation. In fact, 
there is no necessity for the created world to have a temporal 
beginning, since God is completely free to create whenever he wis- 
hes. The genius of St. Thomas Aquinas lies in his perfect distinc- 
tion between what is concerned with faith -creation ex nihilo- and 
what is concerned with reason -existente of a first cause with fre- 
edom and initiative to create out of nothing, since everything 
which moves must necessarily be moved by something else-.21 
Now, perhaps we should reduce the distance which one tends to 
perceive, with regard to the created world, between Plotinus and 
the Christian thinkers: while it is true that the creatio ex nihilo is a 
fact provided by faith, this can also be said, in spite of everything, 
philosophically, in the view of St. Thomas Aquinas, of the fact that 
it should be possible for God to create a universe which is at once 
eterna1 and created in time.22 
In this respect, Christian philosophy, aided by Revelation, 
goes a step further than Plato. He conceived the origin of the 
250 world as an initial act by God to reduce the movement of the irre- 
gular and the disordered, which already existed, to harmony. But 
what Plato fails to resolve, as Eckhart, for example, and even 
Hegel, for that matter, also fail to resolve, is that whatever moves 
must be moved by someone, a difficulty which Aristotle had over- 
come with the definition of the unmoved First Mover. In Plato, 
chaos was not originated by God. This seems to be his opinion and 
obviously suggests the hypothesis of the existence of some other 
creative agent, either blind or malevolent,23 a problem dealt with 
in Christian Revelation by the fact, based on faith, of creatio ex 
nihilo. 
St. Augustine strengthens the idea creation out of nothing. 
He states that when we say that God created things out of nothing, 
we are referring to the fact that there was no pre-existing material 
before He created it,24 thus directly opposing the Platonic propo- 
- -- -- - 
21 Cf. CARROLL, W.E. "S. Tommaso, Aristotele, e la Creazione", Annales 
Theologici, Vol. 8, fasc. 2, 1994, p. 369-370. 
22 Cf. Ibid., p. 370. 
23 INGE, W. R., ThePhilosophy ofPlotinus, vol. 1, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
(1929), 1968, p. 144. 
24 Cf. Ad Orosium, 1-2 and De Div. Quaest., 83. Cited in INGE, 1, p. 145. 
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sition of a Demiurge ordering an already produced world. 
In spite of everything, there is reason to suspect that there 
are various fundamental differences between Plotinus' metaphy- 
sics and creationist metaphysics, such as in the case of St. Thomas 
Aquinas. Perhaps the main reason for such a suspicion is that 
Plotinus is not a bona fide proponent of Parmenides' legacy, 
which refutes the axiom that nothing cannot give rise to nothing. 
The crux of the Thomist philosophical notion of creation is the 
causal dependency of being: Deus est causa universalis totius esse, he 
states. The effect of God's causal activity itself is constitution of 
the being of al1 things.25 And here, Aquinas rather resembles the 
Parmenides from whom Plotinus is distancing himself. But neit- 
her are Plotinus and St. Thomas Aquinas so far apart: when the 
Christian God creates, He causes the (radical) Being of things; on 
the other hand, Plotinus' One unfolds it multiplicity, causing 
"existencel'. 
The concept of Evil is fundamental to understanding the 
relationship between creation with freedom out of nothing and 
the third and last question which 1 wish to examine in this essay. 
1s man free? The answer seems clear-cut: if Plotinus' Hypostasis, 
the One, created out of necessity, and if the Christian God created 25i 
fieely, then one would have to conclude that, in Plotinus' view, 
rnan acts out of necessity, and in the view of Christian philosophy, 
he enjoys the use of free will. 
In this treatise on human freedom, St. Augustine raises an 
apparently disturbing question: On the basis of my understanding 
of the previous book, it is obvious that we enjoy the use of free will 
and that, furthermore, it is the sole source or our sins. In St. 
Augustine's view, not only is freedom not demonstrated -it is 
obvious, self-evident- but it is also the source of evil: sin. He agre- 
es with Plotinus on the formulation of evil as non-being: "evil can- 
not be included in what really exists or in what is beyond existen- 
ce; for these are good. So it remains that if evil exists, it must be 
among non-existent things, as a sort of form of non-existence, and 
pertain to one of the things that are mingled with non-being or 
somehow share in non-being". Now, although there is the same 
formulation of what evil is (both St. Augustine and Plotinus are 
Neoplatonists), the concept is different. In Plotinus, evil is found 
in the sensible: 'The whole world of sense is non-existent in this 
way, and also al1 sense-experience and whatever is posterior or 
25 Cf. GERSON, 1. 1. P., Plotinus, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 27-32. 
incidental to this, or its principle, or one of the elements which go 
to make up the whole which is of this non-existent kind. At this 
point one might be able to arrive at some conception of evil as a 
kind of unmeasuredness in relation to measure, and unbounded- 
ness in relation to limit, and formlessness in relation to formative 
principle, and perpetua1 neediness in relation to what is self-suffi- 
cient; always undefined, nowhere stable, subject to every sort of 
influence, insatiate, complete poverty."26 
Underlying, this doctrine is a concept of freedom, concei- 
ved of as a liberation from corporeality,27 rather than as choice 
between Good and Evil. Providence is thus a sort of destiny, fatal 
in the case of the evil and optimum in the case of the good. The 
good have been able to liberate themselves from the material; the 
evil have remained tied to it. For his part, St. Augustine attacks this 
concept of providence: "Without any doubt, it is by divine provi- 
dence that human kingdoms are set up. If any one ascribes them 
to "fate" because he uses that term for the will or power of God, 
let him maintain his conviction but correct his language."28 
The fundamental difference between human freedom in 
Plotinus and in St. Augustine is that, quite simply, in St. 
252 Augustine's view, this Freedom is the Efficient Cause of human 
actions.29 Human actions are caused by the agent and this is the 
source of freedom, whether in accordance or not with the end 
"provided" by the Creator for His free creature. This is where sin 
and virtue take on their fullest sense, as an adaptation to the end 
of nature itself. In Plotinus, on the other hand, freedom is not in 
fact freedom, since, rather than being the efficient cause of 
actions, it is the final Cause; it is an end in itself which attracts 
human actions in a coercive manner; it is a progressive dissocia- 
tion from the Material, "climbing" Material hypostases to the 
Soul, from the Soul to Intelligence and from Intelligence to the 
One-Good: this is Plotinus' freedom.30 Through the definition of 
26 En., 18, 3, 10-15. Plotinus' texts on the concept of Evil are quite numerous: 
En., 18, 4, 1-5; 12, 4, 13; I8,7; 1112, 7, 1-12, etc. 
27 Cf. SALMONA, B. La libertG in Plotino. Milan: Marzorati, 1967, p. 116. 
28 City of God, V, 1. In: Saint Augustiin the C i p  of God against the Pagans in swen 
volumes. English Translation by William M. Green. Cambridge-Massachusets- 
London: Harvard University Press-William Heinemann Ltd., 1978. Hereafter City. 
29 Cf. INGE, W. R. The Philosophy of Plotinus, Vol. 11. Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press (1929), 1968, p. 186. 
30 "Soul, surely, is another principle which we must bring into reality -not only 
the Soul of the Al1 but also the individual soul along with it as a principle of no small 
irnportance; with this we must weave al1 things together, which does not itself 
ARS BREVIS 1998 CRFA'rION AND FREEDOM IN ANCIENT NEOPLATONISM 
the human soul in relation to its freedom, Plotinus arrives at a 
serious confusion between Providence and destiny applied to 
man's individual freedom. 
But in Christian thought, how is human freedom to be 
made compatible with divine Providence? This is surely the key 
question on subject of the nature of freedom raised by St. 
Augustine. He himself answers: "Al1 powers are derived from him, 
though the wills of al1 men are not ruled by him."31 In his view, 
the existence of a Provident God is crystal clear: "For it is a cons- 
picuous act of madness both to agree that God exists and to deny 
his foreknowledge of the future"32. "We Christians declare both 
that God knows al1 things before they happen, and that it is by our 
own free will that we act, whenever we feel and know that a thing 
is done by us of our own volition. (... ) Moreever, even if there is 
in God's mind a definite pattern of causation, it does not follow 
that nothing is left to the free choice of our will. For in fact, our 
wills also are included in the pattern of causation certainly known 
to God and embraced in his foreknowledge. For the wills of men 
are among the causes of the deeds of men, and so he who foresaw 
the causes of al1 things cannot have been ignorant of our wills 
among those causes, since he foresaw that these wills are the cau- 
ses of our deedf.33 
To conclude this brief essay and after lengthy reflection on 
the texts cited, 1 hope to have shown that Plotinus is, deep down, 
Christian and that St. Augustine, also deep down, is a Plotinist. 
Plotinus takes as his point of departure Timaeus, a profoundly clas- 
sical cosmogony. St. Augustine takes as his point of departure 
Genesis, another cosmogony, which, in its historicity, is the basis, 
as revealed truth, of so many aspects of Christian faith. Both 
Plotinus and St. Augustine are Neoplatonists. Both are seeking the 
same end when they discuss the concepts of creation and freedom: 
to know more about Being, and about the Soul, in order to better 
understand the link between them, to arrive in the best way pos- 
- - - - - - - 
come, like other things, from seeds but is a cause which initiates activity. Now 
when the soul is without body it is in absolute control of itself and free, and ways 
in control, as it forms part of an order with other things. Chances direct, for the 
most part, al1 the things round it, among which it has fallen when it comes to this 
middle point, so that it does some things because of these, but sometimes it masters 
them itself and leads them where it wishes. The better soul has power over more, the 
worse over less." En., 1111, 8, 5-10. 
31 City, V, 8. 
32 Ibid., V, 9, 1. 
33 Ibid., V, 9, 3. 
sible, at a mysticism, a union with God. Plotinus falls into a sort 
of spiritualist pantheism as a result of confusing in the One, being 
and existence, the Efficient Cause with the Final Cause, errors 
which he probably inherited from Plato. But they perhaps meet at 
the end of the way, except that Plotinus remains at the leve1 of 
Theosophy, whereas St. Augustine attains Theology. Plotinus' road 
leads him to ethics, and St. Augustine's leads him to morality. 
Along the way, Christian philosophy is enriched by elements of 
classical culture and the latter opens the way to a new cultural 
revolution: the Middle Ages. 
Abstract 
This article is a text presented at Leeds University during the 
lnternational Congress on Medieval Philosophy. The author focuses his analy- 
sis on the neoplatonic philosophy and tries to observe the various hermeneu- 
tics of this trend of thought in Patristics and a t  the beginning of the Middle 
Ages. 
